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Abstract:  Previously unpublished passages 
from the Cairns Nachlass are assembled and 
commented on to present the identity theory in 
contrast with the traditional coherence and 
correspondence theories, and then seven more 
detailed analyses of related aspects are also 
edited. 
 
To say that a syntactical object is true or 
is a fact, is to say that the act of intending it 
as having a perhaps indistinct structure and 
a perhaps obscure material content may 
unite in a positive synthesis of identification 
with an act wherein “the same” syntactical 
object is distinctly and clearly evident as 
having “the same” structure and content. 
The fulfilling act is eo ipso a grasping of the 
still grasped syntactical object as having 
been produced by a syntactical activity 
founded in original explication of the sub-
ject-matter. The realization of such a syn-
thesis is a verification of the truth (and con-
sistency) of the syntactical object, a verifi-
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Resumen: Se reúnen y comentan pasajes 
inéditos del  Nachlass de Cairns para presentar 
la teoría de la identidad en contraste con las 
tradicionales de la coherencia y la correspon-
dencia, también se editan luego siete análisis 
más detallados de aspectos relacionados. 
 
 
Decir que un objeto sintáctico es cierto o 
es un hecho, es decir que el acto de men-
tarlo como teniendo una estructura tal vez 
confusa y un contenido material tal vez os-
curo, puede unir en una síntesis positiva de 
identificación con un acto en el que "el 
mismo" objeto sintáctico es clara y eviden-
temente teniendo "la misma" estructura y 
contenido. El acto de cumplimiento es eo ip-
so un captación del objeto sintáctico todavía 
captado como habiendo sido producido por 
una actividad sintáctica fundada en explica-
ción original de la materia. La realización de 
tal síntesis es una verificación de la verdad 
(y la consistencia) del objeto sintáctico, una 
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Although he did begin one in 1937, Dorion Cairns (1901-1973), Edmund 
Husserl’s disciple, never wrote essay on verification and truth, but it is sure that 
he could have done so. The present study assembles a score of unpublished 
passages from his lecture scripts and research manuscripts to convey much of 
what such an essay by him would have included. To begin with, there are pas-
sages expounding and opposing two traditional theories of truth and then there 
are sometimes overlapping complementary passages of phenomenological 
analysis. The passages in Roman print are from Cairns and italicized passages 
here are by me as editor. The parenthesized six-digit numbers refer to the 
holographs of the Cairns Nachlass in the archival repository of the Center for 
Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc. from which the passages have been 
transcribed. I thank Professor Richard M. Zaner, Cairns’s literary executor, once 
again for permission to edit a text by our teacher. 
 
 
2. AN ALTERNATIVE TO PREVIOUS POSITIONS 
 
In England, during the 1870’s, there set in a reaction against the type of 
philosophy represented by Mill and Spencer. It is the movement known as 
“British Idealism”; and it dominated British academic philosophy until shortly 
after 1900. Its most important representative, I believe, was Thomas Hill 
Green. At least for the purposes of this course, the most important elements in 
Green’s thought are: First, his thesis that mental activity is essential to the 
producing of objects of knowledge. Second, the so-called “coherence theory” of 
truth. 
The first of these doctrines is opposed to the view that subjective data as-
sociate themselves automatically to make up the objects of possible knowledge. 
According to Green, the elementary components must be actively related, in 
order to produce a world of cognizable things. 
 The “coherence theory of truth” cannot be stated so simply. Green postu-
lates an absolute mind that relates everything to produce an all-embracing and 
perfectly consistent whole. This whole he calls “reality.” “Reality” lies beyond 
the realm of our cognition. Consequently we cannot see that data, as we relate 
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them, correspond to anything in reality. All we can see is the extent to which 
we have organized our limited data coherently. Hence, the only “truth” we can 
approximate consists in their coherence, their mutually consistent organization, 
but we can be sure that, so far we approach such a coherency, we are in some 
measure approaching the universal and perfect coherency of reality, as consti-
tuted by the absolute mind. 
 Considerations of time have led me to omit criticisms of most of the 19th 
century doctrines I have presented. Concerning Green’s, however, I suggest: 
First: He presents us with an illegitimate disjunction when he assumes that the 
objects of possible knowledge are produced either by automatic association or 
by active thinking.—Secondly: The all-inclusive and perfectly self-consistent 
whole which he calls “reality” is an ideal, rather than an actuality.—I may add 
that it is not self-evident that all-inclusiveness and consistency are compatible. 
In actual fact we attain a relatively consistent world only by rejecting some 
data (011283).  
So much for Cairns’s response to the coherence theory of truth. There is 
then the correspondence theory: 
For Locke, as we know, the idea is merely the “impression” on the mind. 
“Idea” ceased to mean the form of an object that makes the impression, 
though some idea corresponded to the form of the object. [...] Moreover, Des-
cartes and Locke extended the concept of idea to include any object of con-
sciousness, whether impressed [or] caused by an outside object or not. And, 
since he thought that all our ideas [or] objects of consciousness are particular 
objects, the Platonic and Aristotelian sense of the idea as a general form, as a 
universal, is lost. For Locke, the so-called universal is a particular abstract idea 
associated with a name & used to stand for all other particular ideas that con-
tain that idea as a part (038603).  
The presupposition underlying the Cartesian and Lockean concept of truth 
as correspondence was that there is an order of real existences to which ideas 
and asserted relations among ideas either correspond or do not correspond 
(011303). 
Setting aside the enormous problem of ascertaining correspondence, its 
degree, or its lack with so-called (and presumably unobservable) outside ob-
jects or real existences, there is this also reaction from Cairns:  
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Explicit judging, judging explicitly “step by step” is an explicitly predicative 
act. It predicates explicitly and thus constitutes a predicatively formed affair-
complex as something given distinctly. But it is said also to constitute a judg-
ment, a judged proposition, as something given distinctly. What then is the re-
lation between the predicatively formed affair-complex (the Sachverhalt) and 
the judgment or judged proposition (the Urteil or Satz)?1 
Traditionally, Sachverhalt or state-of-affairs and judged proposition or Satz 
were regarded as never identical. Propositions were said to be true or false and 
accordingly to correspond or not correspond to states of affairs. This manner of 
speaking is based on the conception of states of affairs exclusively actual or as 
existent states of affairs, exclusively as “facts” in a broad sense (037989).  
Cairns disagrees with this. His alternative position focuses on the identity of 
the Satz and the Sachverhalt. Although more explication will follow below and 
hopefully help, the following is the best concise statement that I have found in 
the  Nachlass— although it could have been clearer about the change from the 
straightforward to reflective attitudes that is involved: 
Judging is a founded syntactical act—founded on intendings of the affairs 
(Sachen) judged about. [There is a w]ider and narrower sense of “judged 
about” (Gegenstände worüber) [and n]ormally, in the course of my judging, I 
am attentive to the affairs judged about, not to the Sachverhalt schlechthin and 
not to the Urteil (der vermeinte Sachverhalt als vermeinte) [sic]. 
In consequence of the judging, the judicatively produced Sachverhalt is 
there for me. It attracts my attention; and I may turn to it and grasp it 
“monothetically”—i.e., in a non-syntactical doxic act. Suppose that I do so. 
Normally, I shall grasp it as Sachverhalt schlechthin: i.e., in grasping it, I shall 
be simply believing in the state-of-affairs, the fact, rather than regarding it as 
what I judge, the supposed state-of-affairs. Nevertheless, it is a vermeinter 
Sachverhalt; and it may be grasped as such,—in other words, as Urteil, as Satz. 
And I do take the vermeinter Sachverhalt als vermeinte [sic], when my 
attitude is “critical”—or when it is that of the apophantical logician dealing with 
judgments or propositions. The indicated doctrine, that Sachverhalt schlechthin 
and vermeinter Sachverhalt—that “fact” and “judgment”—are identical when 
 
 
1 While Sachverhalt is traditionally translated as “state-of-affairs,” Cairns tends to render it as “predica-
tively formed affair-complex.” 
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the judgment is true is fundamental to Husserl’s theory of truth and 
verification. Let me elaborate it. In the case of a judging that is “evident,” the 
supposed state-of-affairs is the given state-of-affairs. We do not have then two 
things that are individually distinct and merely correspondent. 
Verification of a judgment takes place in a consciousness that the supposed 
state-of-affairs is the true or existent state-of-affairs. In short, Husserl’s theory 
of propositional truth is neither a coherence theory nor a correspondence 
theory but what may be called “an identity theory.” The nature of this doctrine 
is clearer when we compare verification of syntactical judgings with verification 
of pre-syntacical beliefs. I mean the other side of physical thing as green. When 
I turn the thing around [,] I see what I meant, as I meant it. That which was 
merely intended is now itself presented in person. There is coincidence of 
identity between the previously meant and the now seen (013679). 
 Some additional passages in the Cairns Nachlass on language, 
propositions, syntactical forming, manner of givenness, positional character, 
intentional synthesis, and clarification enhance the above account. There is 
more emphasis on the preconceptual in them, Cairns holding that verification 
occurs prepredicatively as well as predicatively. 
 
Language and judging 
 Let us return now to Husserl's distinction between proposition and sen-
tence. We said that distinct step-by-step judging usually involves expressing 
the proposition in a sentence. It does not necessarily involve such expression; 
and even when it does involve expression[,] the expression may be either in-
complete or inadequate. At times I may not bother to express all parts of a 
judged proposition in words, even though I am judging it distinctly and com-
pletely. At times I may be at a loss for words—for any words to express my 
judgment or only for words to express it adequately. Nevertheless I may be 
judging distinctly and clearly; I may “know” precisely what I want to express. 
 Furthermore, the expressing of a proposition in a sentence need not in-
volve speaking or writing. It need not involve “embodying” the sentence in sen-
suously perceivable real sounds or marks. The sentence may be embodied in 
phantasied, fictitiously perceived, sounds or marks. This is usually the case 
when we judge silently. The judgment or proposition is more or less completely 
expressed in words, but the words are not actually said or heard, written or 
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read. It is only as-if we were saying or writing, hearing or reading them: the 
real sounds or marks that embody the words are phantasied real sounds or 
marks.  
 Thus we must distinguish not just two but three things on the noematic 
side of an act of express judging: 
1. The judgment or judged proposition. 
2. The more or less complete sentence. 
3. The actual or fictitious realities that embody the sentence. 
Both the proposition and the sentence are ideal;2 whereas the judging act 
and the sounds or marks are real, though they may be only fictitious, phanta-
sied realities. An act of judging can happen just once. Another similar act can 
happen at other times, either in the same flux of mental life or in another. But 
this similar act is not strictly identical with the first, even though it resembles 
the first perfectly. On the other hand, identically the same proposition can be 
judged any number of times and by any number of people. 
Again, a physical sound or mark can happen just once. There may be other 
similar sounds or marks but they are not strictly identical with the first sound or 
mark. On the other hand, the same sentence can be repeated as identical any 
number of times; it can be embodied as identical in any number of distinct and 
different sounds or sets of marks. For example, two copies of the same book 
contain more or less similar printed marks. But no matter how similar the 
printed marks in one copy are to those in the other, they are not the same 
marks. Yet the sentences embodied in one set of marks and the other are 
strictly identical and not merely similar. 
This is what Husserl means when he calls the mental acts of judging and 
the physical sounds or marks real and calls the proposition and the sentence 
irreal or ideal. There is a broader sense in which even physical realities are 
“ideal”: they are like identical objective senses of subjective intendings: sensu-
ous perceivings, rememberings, etc. Indeed, the identical real subjective proc-
 
 
2 Cfr. Dorion Cairns, "The Ideality of Verbal Expressions", in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 
Volume I, June 1941, pp. 453-462. "The Ideality of Verbal Expressions," Revised and expanded reprint 
of the 1941 publication in Phenomenology: Continuation and Criticism, Essays in Memory of Dorion 
Cairns. Edited by Fred Kersten & Richard Zaner. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 
239-250.  
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ess,3 e.g., the individual act of judging or perceiving, is ideal in this broader 
sense, since it is the identical objective sense of different processes in which it 
is expected, presented, retained, and recollected as an identical real process. I 
mention this broader sense of the word ideal only to prevent confusion. What 
interests us now is the narrower sense, in which the ideal or irreal is contrasted 
with the real: Real mental processes, real physical processes, things, and prop-
erties on the one hand; irreal or ideal propositions and sentences on the other 
hand. (There are, however, irreal objects of other kinds.) 
Obviously, if Husserl's three-fold distinction between proposition, sentence, 
and real embodiment of a sentence is correct, then the fashionable type of logic 
that recognizes only sentences—and moreover identifies sentences with actual 
real marks or noises—is wrong from the start. It cannot hope to give a true ac-
count of the facts. 
The noematic complexity of the concrete subjective process of judging, and 
at the same time the expression of the judgment verbally, is the clue to a cor-
responding noetic complexity: a complex structure founding of one noetic stra-
tum or another. The concrete mental process has, as it were, two sides or as-
pects. One is the judging; the other relates to the verbal expression. Let us 
consider this aspect first. This aspect of the concrete subjective process has two 
strata. The lower stratum is consciousness of something physical. It may be a 
sensuous perceiving or recollecting; it may be a phantasy-modification of a 
sensuous-perceiving or recollecting. On this stratum a consciousness of the 
sentence, as embodied in the something physical, is founded. 
Turning now to the other aspect of the concrete subjective process—namely 
to the judging—we find that it too has two strata. They are essential to the 
judging, regardless of whether the judged proposition be expressed in a sen-
tence. 
The judging as such is a higher noetic stratum, founded on a lower. And the 
judgment, the judged proposition, is a higher noematic stratum, a higher the-
sis, founded on lower theses. 
To make this foundedness apparent, consider that predicative judging is not 
only judging something but also judging about something. Take a simple predi-
 
 
3 Early on, Cairns thus translated Husserl’s Erlebnis as “subjective process” in his translation of the 
Cartesianische Meditationen, later, in his translation of Formale und transzententale Logik, as “mental 
process” and finally, in his own lectures and analyses, as “intentive process”. 
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cative judging, e.g., the act of judging that all men are mortal. It is an act of 
judging a proposition about men. But in a wider sense it is a judging also 
“about” mortality. In another sense, it is a judging also about the situation in 
which men and mortality figure. Men and mortality are not components of the 
proposition; nor is the proposition the situation in which men and mortality are 
involved. Relative to the proposition, men and mortality are substrate objects 
and the situation in which they figure, is the substrate of the proposition. 
When judging that all men are mortal, I am also intending these substrates. 
Furthermore, when judging that proposition with simple doxic certainty, I am 
intending these substrates with simple doxic certainty: I am simply believing in 
men and their mortality. The judging, as a categorial or syntactical act, is 
founded on the precategorial, presyntactical intending of the substrate objects 
(01394). 
 
Propositions and judging 
Cairns repeatedly discusses propositions and how they are constituted:  
There is [...] manifested a will to “communicate,” to address myself to the 
auditor, to have him believe what I assert. But “what I assert” is not a noise I 
make, nor a biological adjustment, nor yet is it the act of asserting what I as-
sert. It is the “meaning” of my words, a “proposition,” as logicians say. I ex-
press the proposition and intend that my hearer shall grasp it (037058). 
In perhaps the last 100 years philosophers have used the words “true” and 
“false,” “truth” and “falsity,” almost exclusively as names for properties of 
propositions. Not uncommonly, indeed, a proposition is “defined” as something 
that is either true or false. In present non-philosophic usage, the words often 
express different senses, as they did quite frequently in earlier philosophical 
usage. Descartes, for example, uses the phrase “res vera” to mean an existent 
thing.—The nature of the truth and falsity supposedly peculiar to propositions is 
controversial. Apparently they are properties that depend on the relation of a 
proposition to something else. In most cases one can understand a proposition 
completely, in respect of all its parts and their interrelations, and yet not know 
whether it is true (023117). 
Concerning our terminology, note that usually the English word “proposi-
tion” designates just what Husserl calls the sense of the judging, not what he 
calls the Satz of the judging. There would be some advantage in conforming to 
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common English usage here. But there is no alternative to translating Satz as 
“proposition.” It should always be borne in mind, however, that what Husserl 
calls the Satz or “proposition” is what is usually called, in English, “the asserted 
proposition,” or “the judgment.” Its assertedness is its noematic thetic quality, 
its quality as the thesis of a simply believing act of judging (013595).  
The above passage somewhat clarifies why Cairns refers to the identity 
theory of “propositional” truth rather than, perhaps, “judicative” truth. Thetic 
qualities will be returned to presently.  
Before they can speak of what they call “propositions,” before they can dis-
tinguish the forms of propositions, logicians must objectivate or grasp “proposi-
tions.” When we speak of “propositions” we are not speaking of them as objec-
tivated by logicians. We are speaking of them as the objective senses of judg-
ings, which are not themselves objectivating acts, in the sense of grasping acts. 
Judging is a productive act; it produces a syntactically formed object as its 
sense. But it is not itself a grasping, objectivating act. It is not a grasping of the 
“fact,” the syntactical affair-complex (Sachverhalt) simpliciter. Nor is it a grasp-
ing of the supposed “fact” as supposed (i.e., judgment). The grasping, or even 
the active mere intending of either of these, is another act. 
To be sure, there is a sense in which we too, as phenomenologists, “objec-
tivate” the objective-sense of the judging act, which is our sole accepted da-
tum: we do grasp it, but precisely as exclusively a noematic-objective sense of 
the judging. We do not objectivate it (as does the logician) in the sense of pos-
iting it as an ideal entity (013733). 
Cairns usually refers to singular propositions about physical realities, 
e.g.,“The apple is red,” but it should be recognized that his concern is broader:  
In the case of singular propositions about physical realities (for example: 
“There is someone at the door” or “I have a headache”) the general nature of 
verification seems obvious. Verification is based ultimately on perception of 
what the proposition is about. Similarly, in the case of “Mr. A had orange juice 
for breakfast.”  If someone can remember A’s having or not having orange 
juice, there is a prima facie verification or refutation. 
But the most prized alleged knowledge is not knowledge of such singular 
propositions but knowledge of universal propositions. 
The problem of knowledge of singular propositions may seem easy to the 
uninitiated. But that is not the case with knowledge of a universal proposition 
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that is not merely a compendious statement of verified singulars. Here arise 
obviously tremendous problems. 
Such universal propositions have commonly been divided into two kinds: 
Empirical generalizations and strictly universal propositions. I have perceived 
many cows with cloven hoofs, and none without. I judge that probably all cows 
have cloven hoofs. The proposition that some cow does not have cloven hoofs 
is not self-contradictory. Yet, I judge it to be probably false. I have made an 
inductive or empirical generalization. What is the justification for believing, as I 
do, that it is probably true (023119-023120)? 
 Although one could expect that they be discussed in connection with ei-
detic method, Cairns unfortunately says little about “strictly universal proposi-
tions” in his  Nachlass, but there is this passage. [T]he legitimate propositions 
included in an eidetic science are neither hypotheses nor inductive generaliza-
tions but strictly universal propositions, open to no possible exception. Eventual 
discovery of an actual or even a possible exception shows that the proposition 
was illegitimate in the first place (013388).  
 
Syntactical forming 
It is crucial for the present account that matters or, as Cairns prefers to 
say, affairs (Sachen) are syntactically formed: 
In calling the judging “syntactical” I am not referring to the grammatical 
syntactical form of a sentence. Judgings and their theses (the judged proposi-
tions) are intrinsically syntactical in structure or form. If the sentence that ex-
presses a judgment has a syntactical form or structure (in the linguistic 
sense)—that is because the expressed judgment has its pre-linguistic syntacti-
cal form. And, so far as the sentence fits the proposition that it expresses, the 
grammatical syntax fits and expresses the propositional syntax. This proposi-
tional syntax or form corresponds to the syntax or form of the act of judging 
the proposition about the substrates. The source of propositional and sentential 
syntax is the syntax of judging, step-by-step.4 
 
 
4 It is interesting that Cairns recognizes more than one species of the predicate form in the genus of 
syntactical form:  
Predicatively formed affair-complexes are syntactically formed affair-complexes that contain a sub-
ject-member and a predicate-member. “That Socrates is mortal,” “that Eloise loved Abelard,” “that if 
wishes were horses, beggars would ride,” are particular names for three different predicatively formed 
affair-complexes. Each contains at least one subject-member and one predicate member. In the first, 
the word “Socrates” designates a subject-member, and the phrase “is mortal” designates a predicate 
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With the first step of judging that this surface is yellow, this surface is in-
tended in particular; and in the first judging step, the objective sense of the 
surface-intending is given a syntactical form, namely the subject-form. Thus 
formed, the sense is now the subject of an as yet incompletely judged proposi-
tion. 
With the second step of judging that this surface is yellow, particular atten-
tion turns from this surface as such to its color. The color, the yellow, is now 
particularly intended and, moreover, the sense of the intending is given syntac-
tical form, namely predicate-adjective form, in the second step of judging. The 
transition from the first to the second step of the predicative judging is not a 
mere surface to yellow. It is an active relating of them as subject and predicate 
respectively. This relating has its noematic counterpart, the relation of proposi-
tional subject to propositional predicate. In English and similar languages it so 
happens that this relation is commonly expressed by a distinct word, the cop-
ula. But that is not true in the case of all actual languages. Still the proposi-
tional relation of subject to predicate is there, in the proposition, even if it does 
not receive particular expression.  
Naturally, the subject-predicate form is not the only possible syntactical 
form. Nor is the subject predicate-adjective form any more fundamental than 
some other syntactical forms. (This is red. This is a man. This lives.) An actual 
language, particularly one that is richly equipped with distinguishable elements 
that express syntactical relations within propositions, provides ready clues to a 
variety of such elementary forms. There is, of course, a danger of relying too 
exclusively on such clues, as provided by actual languages with which one is 
acquainted. It seems to me that Husserl did not escape that danger completely. 
Ultimately we must ascertain the possible fundamental syntactical forms of 
judgments by varying as widely as possible the act of syntactical judging. 
 
 
member. In the second, the word “Eloise” designates a subject-member, and the phrase “loved Abelard” 
designates a predicate member. In the first the verb “is” has other functions besides its function as part 
of the phrase designating a predicate. It designates the specific predicative form exemplified in the af-
fair-complex, namely the copular predicative form. The second affair-complex has a different specific 
predicative form, which is designated by the verb “loved” (038002).  
Furthermore, Predicatively formed affair-complexes are a species of syntactically formed affair 
complexes. Collections are another species. To indicate the parallel between the two species we might 
call collections “conjunctively formed affair complexes.” Anything that exemplifies the universal form S is 
p and T is q is both a predicatively and a conjunctively formed affair-complex. Predicatively formed af-
fair-complexes and conjunctively formed affair-complexes are not the only species of syntactically 
formed affair-complexes. The affair-complex, the sun or the moon is [another] (037992).  
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Besides the elementary syntactical forms there are complications of these. 
“This surface is white” is already more complex than “This is a surface.” [Then 
there is] “This surface, which is white, is also smooth.” “This surface is yellow-
ish-white.”—Also [there are] forms that have complete sentences as dependent 
parts [e.g.,] “If this is smooth, it will reflect light.” 
More significant for us now is that syntactical forms are not imposed di-
rectly on raw material. Regardless of whether the sense “This surface” is given 
subject-form it already has the substantive form. And as having substantive 
form, the sense could function syntactically as predicate-object in “I like this 
surface.” 
In short, besides syntactical forms there are core-forms (Kernformen), 
which the sense of the acts of intending the substrates must have, in order to 
assume syntactical forms in a proposition. These core-forms point back to sub-
jective forming processes. Thus the act of judging is more highly stratified than 
at first it seems. At bottom there is always a discriminable stratum of intending 
that has a formless sense. Form, be it substance form, adjective form, or syn-
tactical subject or predicate form, or the like, is originally the correlate of acts. 
The stratum of primary passivity yields only raw material (01394).  
 
Manner of givenness 
Returning to our examination of the intended object with its objective 
sense, we find that an object, X, can be intended as having one and the same 
objective sense in acts that differ in such a manner that what Husserl calls the 
“manner (or “mode”) of givenness” of the object (in its objective sense) differs 
accordingly. Something can be “given” in a sensuous perceiving, or in a re-
membering, or in an empty, completely “blind” intending, as having the sense 
“red, spherical, hard.” Correspondingly, it has a perceptual, or a memorial, or 
an empty “manner of givenness.” The word “givenness” expresses here a broad 
sense: not only what is strictly given, presented, but also what is not strictly 
given at all, but only meant (as part of the sense of the object) is said to have 
its “manner of givenness.” Again, within the sphere of strict presentation, per-
ceptual or memorial, the difference between, e.g., tactual presentedness and 
visual presentedness (now or in the past or the future) is a difference in man-
ner of givenness. The red perceived or remembered sense red is given visually; 
the perceived or remembered hard is given “tactually.” And, if we confine at-
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tention to one such mode of givenness, we find that, for example, the visually 
given objective sense can remain identical, while the clarity of the givenness 
varies. 
Now, just as I can make the objective sense of the object, X, explicit, so I 
can make the manner of givenness explicit. In the first case, I turn my atten-
tion to the elements of the objective sense and, objectivating them, intend: X-
round, red, hard. In the second, I turn to the mode of givenness and say X-
seen, clearly seen as round and red, emptily intended as hard, non-
inflammable, etc. Such words as seen, emptily intended, evident, perceived, 
signify manners of givenness, not elements of the objective sense of the object 
actively intended in a seeing, or an empty intending, etc. (037993). 
 
Positional character 
Let us turn now to yet another dimension of intentional acts: their “posi-
tional character,” as Husserl calls it. We have already mentioned this. In the 
first place we find the class of so-called doxic acts, acts with a doxic positional 
character. This class includes all acts that involve believing in, or disbelieving 
in, their objects, either with simple certainty or with some degree of uncer-
tainty. For example, normal clear and consistent sensuous perceivings are doxic 
acts; and more particularly, they are simply certain believings in their objects 
as having such and such an objective sense. It may be, however, that with re-
spect to some of the objective sense (perhaps because it presented obscurely 
or not strictly presented at all) the object is posited with doxic uncertainty. On 
the other hand, it is not always the case that non-presentedness involves un-
certainty. I am quite certain that this paper is inflammable, though I do not see 
it burning. 
Thesis.5 Now the positional character, particularly the doxic positional char-
acter, of the act has as its correlate what Husserl calls the “thetic character,” 
particularly the doxothetic character of the act-thesis. The object, as “posited” 
with its objective sense, is the “thesis” of the act. If I am simply believing in X, 
I may go on to objectivate the thetic character and say: “X-existent.” If I am 




5 This shoulder head is by Cairns. 
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We have distinguished several modes of intending something as a syntacti-
cally formed affair-complex and, correlatively, several manners in which some-
thing intended as a syntactically formed affair-complex can be given: 
1. Confused intending and givenness in a confused manner. 
2. Distinct intending and givenness in a distinct manner. 
These concern the syntactical form of the intending and the correlative syn-
tactical form of the intended affair-complex. The intending is confused to the 
extent that intended members of the complex are not intended separately—that 
is, each in a particular step of intending.  
But we distinguished, on the other hand, 
3. Blind intending and, correlatively, givenness in an empty manner. 
4. Intuitive intending, clear intending, and, correlatively, givenness in a 
clear, an intuitionally full, manner.6 
These concern, not the syntactical form of the intended affair-complex but 
the syntactically formed stuff: The intending called a clear intending of it to the 
extent that intending of the substrate affairs is clear or intuitive (037993). 
 
Synthesis 
How verification is synthetic is not as clear above as it could be. Mental or 
intentive processes together intend and posit things or are synthetic.7 
As in the case of any other intentive process, so in the case of an intending 
that is not evidence of its object or in the case of an intending that is incom-
plete evidence of its object, there is an intentional horizon that includes poten-
tial intendings of something as identical with the non-evident, or the incom-
pletely evident, thing. And, among these potential intendings, some are pro-
tended as evidences of the actually non-evident, or more nearly complete evi-
dences of the actually incompletely evident thing.— For example, in the case of 
consciousness of something merely as one of the things named by the common 
name, “an apple,” the intentional horizon includes potential intendings pro-
 
 
6 Cairns seems to prefer the opposition of “empty/fulfilled” to that of “blind/intuitive,” probably because 
degrees of fulfillment are more easily referred to. 
7 On the phenomenology of synthesis, see Dorion Cairns: “The Theory of Intentionality in Husserl,” ed. 
Lester Embree, Fred Kersten, and Richard M. Zaner, Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology, 
32 (1999): 116-124. Reprinted in Dermot Moran and Lester Embree, eds., Phenomenology: Critical 
Concepts in Philosophy, 5 vols., London: Routledge, 2004, Vol. I, pp. 184-192. 
THE IDENTITY THEORY OF PROPOSITIONAL TRUTH IN DORION CAIRNS 149 
 
Investigaciones Fenomenológicas, vol. Monográfico 4/II (2013): Razón y Vida. 149 
 
tended as perceivings of an apple or rememberings of an apple as previously 
perceived. 
And, in the case of seeing an apple, the horizon includes potential seeings 
of its other side or its inside, potential tastings which would be evidence of its 
actually non-evident taste, and so forth. 
Let us suppose now that one of these potential evidences becomes actual. 
An identifying synthesis occurs. The evident or more completely evident thing is 
identified with the thing as intended in the now retained non-evidential or in-
completely evidential consciousness. But this is more than an identifying syn-
thesis. It is also a verifying synthesis. The properties merely attributed to the 
thing in the non-presentive or incompletely presentive consciousness of it are 
now presented (013456). 
The intentional horizon belonging to any intentional processes includes pos-
sible processes of intending “something” as “the same as what is intended in 
this process.” In the subsequent course of consciousness, one of those proc-
esses may become actual. The new process then intends its object as “the 
same as what was intended in the previous process.” Thus there occurs, de-
scriptively speaking, a synthesis of identification, or better an identifying syn-
thesis. 
Some intentional processes are consciousnesses of their respective objects 
as presented more or less completely, and more or less clearly, in respect of 
the sense that is attributed to the objects in those processes. Such processes 
are called “evidence” of their objects, or “experiencings” (in a broad sense) of 
their objects. 
Let us consider any intentional process that is not presentive of its object, 
or any process that is imperfectly presentive of its object. As an example of 
non-presentive consciousness we may take the consciousness of something 
merely as “what is signified by this or that name, where the name’s simply ac-
cepted as the name of an existent thing ([e.g.,] Pike’s Peak). 
As an example of imperfectly presentive consciousness we may take any 
sensuous perceiving: In any sensuous perceiving something is meant as having 
more to it than is presented. As a rule, some of the determinations in respect of 
which a sensuous thing is presented are meant as determinations given with 
less than optimal clarity. As in the case of any other intentional process, as in 
the case of such a non-presentive or imperfectly presentive process, there is a 
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co-intended horizon of potential processes of intending the actually intended 
object as “the same.”  
Moreover these horizonal processes include some possible processes that 
would not only intend but also present something as “the same that is actually 
intended.” In the case of an incompletely presentive process, the horizon in-
cludes possible presentations of the same intended thing with respect to its 
non-presented but meant properties. 
In the case of an obscurely presentive process, the horizon includes clearer 
presentations. For example: In a completely non-presentive intending of some-
thing as an apple, possible perceivings or rememberings of that apple are co-
intended. In a perceiving of something as an apple, possible perceivings of it in 
which another side would be not only meant but perceived are cointended. 
Likewise, perceivings of it with respect to its aroma, flavor, weight, etc. And 
perhaps clearer perceivings of its presented color, shape, etc. 
Verifying synthesis.8 In the case of such a non-presentive or imperfectly 
presentive intending, the subsequent flux of consciousness may actualize a 
horizonal presentive or more perfect presentive consciousness of “the same.” 
There is thus a synthesis of identification, which is also a synthesis of verifica-
tion. 
The non-presentive intending of the other side of this apple is a believing in 
the other side. When something is seen or touched as “the other side”—the 
same other side that was meant before it was seen—that believing is verified. 
And, if the other side was meant as red, seeing it as red verifies the previous 
meaning of it as red. Or, if I see it obscurely as red, seeing it clearly as red in-
volves a synthesis of verification. 
As a rule, the horizonal anticipations of things are less completely determi-
nate than the presentations that fulfill them. The non-presented other side of 
what is presented as an apple is meant, let us say, as red only more or less 
similar in color to the presented side. But, when the other side is seen, it may 
be seen as having a more precise shade of red color. Thus, as a rule, synthesis 




8 This is Cairns’s shoulder heading. 
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Synthesis of verification has, as its opposite counterpart, synthesis of an-
nulment. The horizon of any non-presentive or obscurely presentive conscious-
ness includes possible processes in which “the same” would be presented as 
being otherwise than it is now intended as being. For example, though the un-
seen other side of an apple is intended as red, and there is thus a horizonal 
anticipation of seeing the other side as red, there is also a predelineated possi-
bility that the other side will be presented as green or even blue. 
If the subsequent course of experience actualizes a seeing of the other side 
as blue, when it was believed to be red, we have indeed a synthesis of identifi-
cation and even a synthesis of partial verification in so far as the thing was be-
lieved to have another side with some color. But the fulfillment of the empty 
consciousness is also a synthesis of partial annulment: the believing in the 
other side as red is annulled. 
In some cases even that which is clearly presented may be annulled by the 
future course of experience. Consider, for example, things presented in dreams. 
At least in the case of sensuous perceivings syntheses of annulment are always 
horizonal possibilities. 
But two facts should be noted about the normal case of annulment: (1) The 
annulment is only partial—i.e., there is also a partial verification. (2) The an-
nulment does not leave a void: something takes the place of what has been 
annulled by evidence. It is a matter of “not so, but otherwise.” This is true even 
of what is presented in a dream. A synthesis of identity between what was pre-
sented in dream and what is presented later becomes effected, and the latter 
replaces to former, annulling it, but not wholly (013484). 
 
Clarifiction 
Cairns writes: I can read and blindly judge: “The leaves are out on some of 
the trees in Central Park.” I clarify this judgment by phantasying that it is being 
judged on the basis of seeing or remembering leaves on some of the trees. I.e., 
I must effect a fictive seeing, or fictive remembering of the leaves (013498).  
Closely related to syntheses of verification and annulment are syntheses of 
“clarification,” in one sense of the word. Just as verification and annulment pro-
vide, respectively, evidence of the intended thing as being or not being, so syn-
theses of clarification provide evidence of the intended thing as essentially pos-
sible or impossible. 
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A synthesis of positive clarification occurs when, starting from an empty in-
tending, the subsequent course of consciousness actualizes a fictive presenta-
tion of something as identical with what was intended. If, on the other hand, an 
attempt at positive clarification shows that intended determinations of the ob-
ject are irreconcilable in a fictively presented object, then the clarification 
brings evidence of the object’s essential impossibility. 
In another sense of the word, “clarification” occurs when something already 
presented obscurely becomes presented clearly, 
What is usually called clarification involves both types of identifying synthe-
sis: On the one hand, certain things that were not presented become actually 
or fictively presented; on the other hand, certain things that were presented 





Although there are only a passing allusions to judging and judgment in it, 
the following passage can serve as a closing final statement of the identity the-
ory of propositional truth. 
There is now going on in my stream of mental life a process describable as 
“seeing a table.” In this seeing, the table is intended as an object of other pos-
sible processes of intending it. It is intended as an object of possible seeings in 
which it would appear differently (from nearer or further, from the other side). 
It is intended as an object also of possible non-visual perceivings (tactual, audi-
tory, etc.). Likewise, as an object of possible rememberings corresponding to 
such perceivings. Furthermore, it is intended as something that might be 
judged about, that might be named or depicted, and that might then be in-
tended symbolically, perhaps without being intuited at all. 
All these things, moreover, are true not only of this particular intentive 
process, but of any intentive process. Any conscious process intends its object 
as also the object of other possible conscious processes of various kinds. If one 
of these other processes becomes actual, there may also occur in my mental 
life an identifying synthesis. Thus, if I actually go on to see the table from an-
other point of view the table seen from the new point of view may be identified 
with the table seen from the old point of view, if the previous seeing is remem-
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bered. Or, when I judge about the table, the table as judged about is identified 
with the table as perceived. 
We may say also that the process of seeing the table itself a continuous 
identifying synthesis, because the object of each phase of the seeing is identi-
fied with the objects of the preceding phases. 
Now among identifying syntheses, or syntheses of identification, some are 
characterized as what Husserl calls “syntheses of fulfillment.” Let me explain by 
returning to our example. 
In my seeing of this table, this table is presented in respect of only that 
part of its surface that is strictly seen. But it is intended as having more to it 
than is actually presented. The particular seeing is an intuiting, but an incom-
plete intuiting, of its object. The intended but non-presented determinations of 
the table are, we may say, only emptily intended in this seeing. 
But now, if I see the table from another point of view, or if I perceive it tac-
tually, and a synthesis of identification occurs, then the previously empty in-
tending becomes filled with something actually presented. For example: parts 
of the surface not seen before become seen; or surface textures that were only 
emptily intended become themselves presented, presented tactually. 
Now a closer examination of the initial seeing will show that it intended the 
object not just as having something more to it than was presented, but as hav-
ing something more of particular kinds. Since the actually presented surface is 
presented as brown, the non-presented surfaces are emptily intended as of a 
similar brown. If an identifying synthesis of fulfillment takes place, the fulfill-
ment of the empty intending may be partially negative. For example, the sur-
face, which was emptily intended as brown, may become presented as indeed 
the same surface that was intended, but presented as having some color other 
than brown. The empty intending of the surface as such is positively filled; but 
the empty intending of it as brown is negatively fulfilled. 
Similarly, in the seeing, the table is intended not just as having some tex-
ture, but as having a rather smooth texture. If the tactual perceiving presents a 
rougher texture, then fulfillment of the empty intending is partly positive, since 
some texture is presented; but it is also partly negative (011344-011346). 
  
 
